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(Solution document) Choose the one best answer. According to the Divine Command Theory, a. if God commanded us to keep our promises, then he did that because keeping our...


Choose the one best answer.

1. According to the Divine Command Theory,

a. if God commanded us to keep our promises, then he did that because keeping our promises is the

right thing to do.

b. if keeping our promises is the right thing to do, then that's because God commanded that we keep

our promises.

c. blasphemy is wrong but slavery is not wrong.

d. adultery is just plain wrong, and God commanded us to not to commit it.

e. God exists for some cultures but not for others.


2. According to ethical egoism,

a. people always do what they believe to be in their own long-term best interest.

b. people always do what is in fact in their own long-term best interest.

c. people are morally required to do what is in their own long-term best interest.

d. people are rationally required to do what is in their own long-term best interest.

e. people are rationally required always to do what maximizes expected agentive utility.


3. According to normative cultural relativism,

a. different cultures have different views about what morality requires; no two cultures or societies

share the same moral code.

b. tolerance of and respect for the beliefs and practices of societies other than one's own is the

supreme principle of morality.

c. morality is relative; there are no objective moral facts. For any given act A, that act is right

according to some frameworks and wrong according to others, and no framework is objectively

correct.

d. an act is morally permissible if and only if its agent believes that it is right.

e. if an act A is performed in society S, and that act violates the moral code of society S, then it is an

objective fact that act A is morally wrong. Anyone who believes that A is right is mistaken.


4. Utilitarianism

a. says that, morally speaking, you shouldn't perform a given action unless no other action open to

you in the given situation has a higher utility.

b. is incompatible with the Divine Command Theory.

c. says that the rational thing to do in any situation is the option that maximizes expected utility.

d. doesn't make sense unless moral relativism is true.

e. is a form of Error Theory.


5. Is the Divine Command Theory compatible with utilitarianism? That is, could they both be true at once?

a. Yes, because utilitarianism is a view about what it is rational for us to do, whereas DCT is a view

about what morality requires of us.

b. No, because utilitarianism requires us to reject religious practices.

c. Yes, at least if it's possible that God's only command to us is that we must maximize utility.

d. No, because if utilitarianism is true, there is no objective morality.


6. According to non-consequentialists:

a. the consequences of an action are irrelevant to whether the action is morally permissible.

b. it is never morally permissible to perform the action, of those available, that has the best

consequences.

c. we often do the wrong thing without suffering any consequences of our misdeed.

d. there are possible cases in which the act (of those available to the agent at the time) that has the

best consequences is not morally required and may even be morally wrong.


7. Which of the following cases was presented in class as a potential counterexample to utilitarianism?

a. the organ transplant case.

b. Singer's case of the drowning child.

c. the case of the Good Samaritan.

d. the case of wartime self-sacrifice.

Judith Jarvis Thomson discusses the following cases:

Bystander's Two Options: he can

(i) do nothing, letting five die, or

(ii) throw the switch to the right, killing one.

Fat Man: I can

(i) do nothing, letting five die, or

(ii) shove the fat man off the footbridge down onto the track, thereby killing him, but also,

since he's very big, stopping the tram and saving the five.

According to Thomson, the Trolley Problem is the problem of explaining why it is permissible for the

bystander to choose (ii) in Bystander's Two Options, whereas it is not permissible to choose option (ii) in Fat

Man.


8. According to Professor Gilmore in lecture, why did Thomson initially hold that Letting Five Die Vs.

Killing One Principle ("A must let five die if saving them requires killing B" ? essentially Foot's Principle

about positive and negative duties) does not solve the Trolley Problem?

a. Because that principle yields the result that it is permissible to shove the fat man off the

footbridge in Fat Man.

b. Because that principle yields the result that it is not permissible to throw the switch in

Bystander's Two Options.

c. Because that principle yields the result that it is not permissible to shove the fat man off the

footbridge in Fat Man.

d. Because that principle yields the result that it is permissible to throw the switch in Bystander's

Two Options.


9. How would the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) apply to the Trolley Problem? According to Professor

Gilmore in lecture, DDE yields the result that:

a. neither throwing the switch, nor shoving the fat man, are permissible.

b. throwing the switch is permissible, whereas shoving the fat man is not permissible.

c. throwing the switch is not permissible, but shoving the fat man is permissible.

d. both actions are permissible.


For question #10, consider

Argument A

(1) If God does not exist, objective moral facts do not exist.

(2) Objective moral facts do exist.

(3) Therefore, God exists.

10. If one is both a meta-ethical realist (who accepts, e.g., utilitarianism) and an atheist, one will

a. reject both (1) and (2).

b. accept both (1) and (2) but claim that the argument is invalid, and reject (3).

c. reject (2) but accept (1).

d. reject (1) but accept (2).

e. None of the above.


For question #11, consider the following argument:

Argument B

(1) If God exists, then there are objective moral facts.

(2) There are objective moral facts.

(3) Therefore, God exists.

11. An atheist who is a meta-ethical realist should respond to this argument by:

a. claiming that the argument is invalid.

b. accepting (1) but rejecting (2).

c. claiming that the argument begs the question.

d. accepting (2) but rejecting (1).

e. none of the above.


12. What is the difference between utilitarianism and consequentialism?

a. consequentialism leaves open questions about which things are intrinsically good, whereas

utilitarianism entails that pleasure and/or happiness are what is intrinsically good.

b. utilitarianism says that morality requires our acts to be useful, whereas consequentialism says that

morality requires our acts to have good consequences.

c. consequentialism is a view about which things are intrinsically good (pleasure and/or happiness

only), whereas utilitarianism is a view about which acts are morally right (the ones that have the best

consequences).

d. utilitarianism is a view about which things are intrinsically good (pleasure and/or happiness only),

whereas consequentialism is a view about which things are intrinsically bad (pain and/or

unhappiness only).


13. Consider the "Too Stringent for Humans" objection to utilitarianism:

P1 If utilitarianism is true, then an act is permissible if and only if it is motivated by a desire to

promote the general interests of society.

P2 But some acts are permissible even though they are not motivated by such a desire.

------

C Therefore, utilitarianism is not true.

According to Professor Gilmore, in lecture, what is wrong with this argument?

a. P1 is false. Utilitarianism doesn't require that an act must have a certain motivation in order to be

permissible; it just requires that the act actually maximize utility.

b. P2 is false. There are no plausible examples of morally permissible acts that are not motivated by a

desire to make the world a better place. The only alternative motivation is self-interest, and that

leads only to wrong actions.

c. C is false, since there are convincing arguments for utilitarianism.

d. The argument is invalid.


14. As discussed in lecture, Robert Nozick's Experience Machine example is designed to show that

a. pleasure is not the only thing that is intrinsically good for a person.

b. we can't tell whether or not there's an external world.

c. the morally right act is not always the one with the best consequences.

d. it is intrinsically bad for a person to think that her so-called 'friends' are mere illusions.


15. To say that a statement can be known without reliance on sense experience for justification is to say that

the statement is:

a. Analytic

b. A priori

c. Necessary

d. A posteriori

e. None of the above


16. Which of the following would Gettier accept?

a. Sometimes, a person really does know a given proposition p (say, the proposition that Team 1 will

win), even though p is not true (Team 1 will not win). That is, it's not merely that the person thinks

that he/she knows p. It's that the person really does know p. And yet p is false.

b. Sometimes, a person really does believe a given proposition p (say, the proposition that Team 1

will win), even though p is not true (Team 1 will not win). That is, it's not merely that the person

thinks that he/she believes p. It's that the person really does believe p. And yet p is false.

c. Sometimes, a proposition p (say, the proposition that Team 1 will win) really is true, and yet the

world is not as p represents it as being (Team 1 will not win). That is, it's not merely that some

person thinks that p is true. It's that p really is true. And yet Team 1 will not win.

d. Sometimes, a person really does know a given proposition p (say, the proposition that Team 1 will

win), even though that person does not believe. That is, it's not merely that the person thinks

that he/she knows p. It's that the person really does know p. And yet the person doesn't believe p.


17. Consider Case II from Gettier's paper. According to Gettier:

a. Smith knows, but is not justified in believing, that Jones owns a Ford.

b. Jones does own a Ford, but Smith doesn't know that Jones owns a Ford.

c. Smith is justified in believing, but does not know, that Jones owns a Ford.

d. Smith knows that Brown is in Barcelona, but Smith does not know that Jones owns a Ford.


18. Does the JTBN account help with Gettier's Case II? If so, how? Note: 'help with' means avoid being

counterexampled by. So, the JTBN account helps with that case if and only if that case is not a

counterexample to the JTBN account.

a. It does not help. As applied to that case, it yields the same verdicts as the JTB account.

b. It does help. Since Smith's justification for his belief that (h) (Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in

Barcelona) depends upon the belief that Jones owns a Ford, which is false, the JTBN account says

that Smith doesn't know (h).

c. It does not help. As applied to that case, the JTBN account yields the verdict that Smith does not

know (h). But the correct verdict, according to Gettier and most others, is that Smith does know (h).

d. It does help. Since (h) is false, Smith doesn't know it, according to the JTBN account, since on

that account knowledge is factive.


19. According to the JTBN analysis of knowledge, the reason why (in Gettier's example) Smith doesn't

count as knowing that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket is that:

a. Smith believes that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, but this belief was not

caused by the fact that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

b. Smith believes that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, and he has a

justification for this belief, but he does not have a complete justification for it.

c. Smith believes that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, and he is justified in

holding this belief, but his justification depends on a false assumption.

d. Smith believes that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, but since the man

who Smith thinks will get the job is not the man who will really get the job, Smith's belief is false,

and so cannot count as knowledge.

e. Smith is not completely certain that the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket

(though he believes it).


20. Which ONE of the following is FALSE?

a. I can know a priori that all triangles have three sides.

b. I can know a priori that red is a color.

c. I can know a priori that if Doris is a widow, then she has at least one dead spouse.

d. I can know a priori that Bob is a bachelor.


21. Who endorses the following statement? "We do not have any a priori knowledge of synthetic truths."

a. Rationalists.

b. Empiricists.

c. Materialists.

d. Dualists.


22. Suppose that it didn't rain yesterday, but Bob is 100% certain that it did rain yesterday. According to the

standard view of knowledge presented in lecture, does Bob know that it rained yesterday?

a. Yes, because to know something is just to be 100% certain that it's true.

b. No, because even though Bob feels certain, others may disagree with him, and you can't know

something if others think it's false.

c. Yes, because if Bob is 100% certain that it rained yesterday, then it's true for him that it rained

yesterday.

d. No, because even though Bob is 100% certain that it rained yesterday, the proposition that he

believes is false, and one can't know a false proposition.

e. Yes, because Bob believes that it rained yesterday, and belief is sufficient for knowledge.


23. Why, according to the standard view of knowledge presented in lecture, can't knowledge simply be

defined as belief? I.e., why can't we say that to know a given proposition is just to believe that proposition?

a. Because the mere fact that, say, Bush believed that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq

didn't guarantee that he was 100% certain that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

b. Because it's possible to know something and to believe it at the very same time.

c. Because there are clear cases in which a person does believe a given proposition but does not

know that proposition. Certain people believe that humans never landed on the moon. But no one

knows that humans never landed on the moon, since humans really did land there.

d. Because there are clear cases in which a person does know a given proposition but does not

believe that proposition. Certain people know that humans never landed on the moon. But no one

believes that humans never landed on the moon, since humans really did land there.

e. Because that definition would be circular. Belief is defined in terms of knowledge.


24. The three components of JTB account of knowledge discussed in class are:

a. Justification, Skepticism, and Belief

b. Property Dualism, Truth, and Belief

c. Justification, Truth, and Evidence

d. Justification, Truth, and Belief

e. Materialism, Evidence, and Belief


25. According to the standard view of knowledge presented in lecture, why can't knowledge be defined as

true belief? That is, why can't we say that a person knows a given proposition if and only if that person

believes the given proposition, and the proposition is true?

a. Because there are clear cases in which a person does know a given proposition but does not have a

true belief in that proposition. Certain people know that humans never landed on the moon. But no

one has a true belief that humans never landed on the moon, since humans really did land there.

b. Because some propositions can be both known and believed to be true.

c. Because some propositions can be both known and true.

d. Because it's possible to know something and to have a true belief in it at the very same time. If I

know that there is a tree outside my office window, and I also happen to believe that there is one, and

furthermore there really is one, then I have a true belief in a given proposition and I know that

proposition at the same time.

e. Because there are clear cases in which a person does believe a given proposition and the

proposition is true, but the person does not know that proposition. When someone, on the basis of no

evidence, believes that horse #9 will win, and it does, the given person does not (prior to seeing the

race) know that horse #9 will win, though they believe it, and their belief is true.


26. As described in the lectures, propositions are:

a. sentences.

b. parts of sentences, such a words and phrases.

c. things that can be expressed by sentences and that can be true or false.

d. words that can be used to form propositional phrases, such as 'of', 'from', 'in', 'over', etc.

e. mental images, such as those that come to us in dreams.


27. According to Gettier, justification, truth, and belief are:

a. insufficient for knowledge.

b. unnecessary for knowledge.

c. irrelevant to knowledge.

d. neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge.

e. all of the above.


The Deceiver Argument

1. Your sensory experiences could come about through ordinary perception, so that most of what

you believe about the world is true. But your sensory experiences could also be caused

deceptively, so that what you believe about the world is entirely false.

2. You have no reason at all to believe that your sensory experiences arise in one way rather than

another.

3. [Underdetermination Principle] If you are faced with two or more mutually exclusive hypotheses,

and the information available to you gives you no reason to believe one rather than another, then

you don't know that either hypothesis is the case, and you have no reason to think that either is

any more likely than the other.

4. If (1), (2), and (3) are true, then you don't know that the real world hypothesis is true, and you

are not justified in believing that it is any more likely than its main competitors.

5. So, you don't know that the real world hypothesis is true, and you are not justified in believing

that it is any more likely than its main competitors.


28. According to the explanationist response to the Deceiver Argument, do we have (epistemic) reason to

believe that the real world hypothesis is more likely to be true than the isomorphic skeptical hypothesis?

a. Yes. The real world hypothesis is a better explanation of our evidence than the isomorphic

skeptical hypothesis, and this makes it more likely to be true.

b. No. The real world hypothesis is a better explanation of our evidence than the isomorphic

skeptical hypothesis, but as far as we can tell, this is irrelevant to the question of which is more likely

to be true.

c. Yes. Only the real world hypothesis fits our experiential data. The isomorphic skeptical hypothesis

predicts that we feel ourselves to be trapped inside a computer, when in fact we feel no such thing.

d. No. Since both the real world hypothesis and the isomorphic skeptical hypothesis fit our

experiential data equally well, we should take them to be equally probable.

e. Yes. The real world hypothesis is the best explanation of this piece of data: the external world

exists and is approximately as we experience it to be. The isomorphic skeptical hypothesis can give

no explanation of that piece of data.


29. According to the lectures, Descartes is

a. a skeptic about the external world.

b. a normative cultural relativist.

c. a rationalist and a non-skeptic about the external world.

d. an empiricist and a non-skeptic about the external world.

e. a mystic and a theist.


30. According to Descartes (in the First Meditation), which of the following possibilities gives Descartes a

reason to doubt that he has a body?

a. God might be deceiving him into thinking that he has a body, when in fact he doesn't have

one.

b. Inductive arguments may be useless, given that the only empirical justifications for them are

circular.

c. God might be deceiving him into thinking that he is a human, when in fact he is a dog.

d. He might be an immaterial soul.

e. None of the above.


31. According to the Phaedo, Socrates did not fear his death. Why not?

a. Because he believed that his soul was immortal and everlasting and that it was well-prepared to

benefit from being released from the body and its distractions.

b. Because he believed that the self is an illusion, that he never really existed in the first place, and

hence that he could neither die nor suffer after death.

c. Because he believed that he could not by harmed by death either (i) while still alive (when death

has not yet arrived) or (ii) at or after the moment of death, when he will no longer exist at all and

hence cannot be harmed in any way.

d. Because he believed that there is a perfect symmetry between birth and death. Just as a person's

pre-natal non-existence is not harmful to that person, a person's post-mortem non-existence is not

harmful to that person.


32. According to the interpretation of Plato's theory of Forms given in lecture:

a. Forms are ideas or concepts in the human mind which represent things in the world. If there were

no people or other thinkers, there would be no Forms. Justice and Beauty are subjective; they are

ideas that we thinkers have created. Without us, nothing would be just, and nothing would be

beautiful.

b. Forms are shapes. If I draw two exactly similar triangles in two different places on the chalk

board, there will be two exactly similar triangular Forms located at different places on the chalk

board. Each of them will be visible. There will be two Triangularities in front of us.

c. Forms are mind-independent abstract entities that are properties and/or relations and perfect

exemplars. The Form of Beauty is not located in space, not visible, it would still exist even if there

were no thinkers, and it is beautiful.

d. Forms are gods, souls, and other spiritual entities. My soul is the Form of Life. When my body

partakes of this Form, it thereby becomes alive. When it ceases to partake of this form, my body

thereby becomes dead. Given the self-predication principle, the Form of Life is itself alive, and this

fact never changes. So the Form of Life will never die. Since my soul just is the Form of Life, it

follows that my soul will never die. This explains why I am immortal.


33. In the Phaedo, after Socrates presents the Affinity argument, Simmias and Cebes raise objections to

Socrates's views. Which of the following is not one of the objections raised there by Simmias or Cebes?

(Some of the objections below are presented using slightly different terminology than Plato uses.)

a. What Socrates says about the soul could also be said about the attunement of a musical

instrument: it is invisible, incorporeal, splendid, divine, and located in the instrument; whereas the

instrument is material, composite, and perishable. But if the soul is like attunement, it is not

everlasting and gives us little hope for 'life after death'.

b. True, souls are more like Forms than bodies are. But it doesn't follow that souls are more likely to

resemble Forms in ALL ways. A marble statue of a man is more like a real human being than an

unworked granite boulder is. But it doesn't follow that a marble statue of a man is more likely to

start to recite the Iliad than an unworked granite boulder is. They are both equally unlikely to start to

recite the Iliad.

c. A person's soul may have existed before the person was born and may even have been associated

with other bodies. But it doesn't follow that the person's soul will continue to exist forever. Just as a

person wears out many cloaks but eventually dies and never gets another cloak, the soul may wear

out many bodies but eventually cease to exist and become attached to no further bodies.

d. None of the above. (Simmias or Cebes raise all three of the above objections.)


34. After Simmias and Cebes raise their objections, Socrates replies. Which of the following is not one of the

replies that Socrates gives?

a. Given that knowledge is recollection, our souls existed before our births. But the attunement of a

musical instrument cannot exist before that instrument does. So a person's soul cannot be anything

like the attunement of his/her body's parts.

b. The soul directs the body and its parts, but the attunement of a musical instrument does not direct

that instrument or its parts? rather it is directed by the instrument and its parts.

c. Attunements come in degrees, but souls do not.

d. All of the above. (Socrates does not give any of the above replies.)


35. Consider the following passage.

'So the soul will never admit the opposite of that which it brings along, as we agree from what has

been said?'

This sentence is a part of Socrates's presentation of what we, in lecture, have been calling

a. The Cyclical Argument.

b. The Argument from Recollection.

c. The Affinity Argument.

d. The Argument from the Form of Life.

e. The Argument from Opposites.


36. Consider the following passage.

'Let us examine whether those that have an opposite must necessarily come to be from their opposite

and from nowhere else, as for example when something comes to be larger it must necessarily

become larger from having been smaller before.'

This sentence is a part of Socrates's presentation of what we, in lecture, have been calling

a. The Cyclical Argument.

b. The Argument from Recollection.

c. The Affinity Argument.

d. The Argument from the Form of Life.

e. The Argument from Opposites.


37. Consider the following passage.

'Consider, he said, whether this is the case: we say that there is something that is equal. I do not

mean a stick equal to a stick or a stone to a stone, or anything of that kind, but something else

beyond all these, the Equal itself. Shall we say it exists or not?'

This is a part of Socrates's presentation of what we, in lecture, have been calling

a. The Cyclical Argument.

b. The Argument from Recollection.

c. The Affinity Argument.

d. The Argument from the Form of Life.

e. The Argument from Opposites.


38. Consider the following passage.

'Consider then, Cebes, whether it follows from all that has been said that the soul is most like the

divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, always the same as itself, whereas the body is

most like that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble and never consistently the

same.'

It is a part of Socrates's presentation of what we, in lecture, have been calling

a. The Cyclical Argument.

b. The Argument from Recollection.

c. The Affinity Argument.

d. The Argument from the Form of Life.

e. The Argument from Opposites.

 







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